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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 130

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 07/02/1998

Where it occurred: Dargai village, Tani
District, Khost
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
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An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer for six years. He was working on land described as "grazing
land" [in Afghanistan this means "rocky hills"].
The investigators determined that the deminer was resting while his partner worked when he
saw a fuse in the uncleared area at the side of the lane. He picked it up and "started playing"
with it and it exploded. The Section Leader was covering for another deminer who had gone
to urinate [so was not observing].
The victim stated he was collecting fragments that remained in the cleared area/breaching
lane and picked up a part of a "PMN-2" which was covered in soil. He knocked it against a
stone to remove the soil and it exploded.
The Sub-Commander said the victim was working improperly because he should have been
controlling his partner.
The Section Leader stated the victim was negligent.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim ignored safety precautions by playing with the
fuse and that the absence of the Section Leader was a contributory factor.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that Section Leaders should not be assigned to cover for
deminers in breaching parties, that the command group must stress the danger of touching
UXO/devices, and that the Section Leader should be disciplined for his poor performance.

Victim Report
Victim number: 166

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: not recorded

Thin, short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Eyes
minor Face
minor Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Fingers
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
The accident report listed the victim's injuries as amputation of five fingers of his left hand,
"superficial" injuries to his right hand, face and nose, and foreign bodies to both eyes.
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) showed left hand and facial injury.

A photograph showed that all fingers on the victim's left hand had been traumatically
amputated and the palm opened [like a rose]. A later photograph (after dressing) showed that
the body of the hand and the thumb were apparently still in place. The victim was looking at
the camera and his eyes appear clear, so the eye injury is thought to have been minor.
The insurers were informed on 6th March 1998 that the victim had lost all the fingers of his left
hand and got foreign bodies in his eyes in an accident on 15th February 1998 [sic] when a
fuse went off in his hand. [Dates were frequently mistranslated in Afghan reports.]
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because (as the
investigators found) the field supervisor was absent and the victim's error went uncorrected.
It is possible that the device was left over from the inadequate destruction of a PMN-2 during
routine clearance, as has happened in other accidents.
The victim appears to have been unaware of the danger of handling parts of a PMN-2, which
implies inadequate training. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
Gathering of medical treatment and compensation details was prevented by the UN
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
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